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Abstract: 
We examine the asset allocation, returns, and expenses of superannuation funds whose 
assets are mainly invested in default investment options between 2004 and 2012. A 
majority of these funds fail to earn returns commensurate with their strategic asset 
allocation policy. It appears that much of the variation of returns between the funds 
might be a result of their engaging in significant active management of assets. Our 
results indicate that returns from active management are negatively related to expenses. 
We also find strong evidence of economies of scale existing in these superannuation 
funds across different size categories. 
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1. Introduction 
The level of public scrutiny of the performance of superannuation funds has intensified in 
recent times. The erosion of superannuation account balances of fund members and 
retirees (with account based pensions) in the aftermath of Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
has renewed the debate over whether superannuation funds are serving their constituents 
well. By analysing the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) statistics in 
2010, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) reported that the annually 
compounded net return of superannuation funds between 1997 and 2009 was only 3.04%, 
which was barely ahead of an inflation rate of 2.8% and much lower than the 4.5% 
average return offered by bank term deposits during this period (Long 2010). The report 
argued that the system-wide poor returns could not be attributed to share market 
downturns (as the Australian share market returned 6.6% during the same period) but 
were mainly driven by very high fees and expenses charged by some funds.  
The issue of higher expenses dragging down members’ returns was a focal point 
of the Cooper Review of Australian Superannuation System, which submitted its 
recommendations to the Commonwealth Government in 2010. It is well known that 
majority of members accept the default option nominated by the trustees of their funds.1 
The Cooper Review has recommended that the default option be designed as a cost-
effective product called MySuper that would include a range of regulatory requirements 
to ensure trustee accountability in terms of pursuit of members’ best interest and the 
containment of fees and expenses (Cooper 2010) 
                                                          
1 In Australia, as of June 2012, nearly half of all superannuation assets were invested in default investment 
options (APRA 2013a). If we exclude retail funds, nearly two-thirds of all superannuation assets were 
invested in default investment options. But this phenomenon is not uniquely Australian. For example, in 
the US, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2003) found that 80% of assets of retirement plans in their 
study are invested in default options. The evidence on default options is similar in countries like UK 
(Bridgeland 2002) and Sweden (Cronqvist and Thaler 2004). 
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In this paper, we examine the asset allocation, returns and expenses of Australian 
superannuation funds during the period 2004-2012 with respect to their default 
investment options. Basu and Drew (2010) observe significant variation between default 
investment options in terms of their asset allocation strategies. We seek to analyse that to 
what extent could the variation in returns of default options be attributed to the asset 
allocation strategies selected by the trustees. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
investigate the role of asset allocation in explaining the cross-sectional variation in 
returns of superannuation funds.  
Next, we explore the relationship between superannuation fund returns and 
expenses. Apart from looking at total returns, we isolate the returns attributable to active 
management only and investigate how it relates to fund expenses. This is an important 
contribution since the question of whether higher expenses, commonly associated with 
active management, lead to higher returns has not been studied before in the context of 
Australian superannuation funds.  
Finally, we examine factors like fund size that could be responsible for the 
variation in expense ratios of individual funds. The evidence on economies of scale in 
superannuation funds is divided. Moreover, the research on this topic is quite dated since 
the last study with a large sample of funds (Coleman, Esho, and Wong 2006) examined 
data that is now almost a decade old. Recently Sy (2010) looks into the issue of 
economies of scale but his sample consists of small APRA funds only. Our study updates 
the literature on existence of cost efficiencies by analysing data between July 2003 and 
June 2012. 
 Prior to this paper, Ellis, Tobin, and Tracey (2008) attempt to investigate 
investment performance, asset allocation and expenses of superannuation funds. Besides 
presenting more recent evidence, our work differs from their study in a number of ways. 
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First, the sample in Ellis et al. (2008) consists only of funds that survived till 2006, which 
exposes their results to survivorship bias.2 Our study is free from such survivorship 
issues and therefore, the results are more indicative of actual performance. Second, whilst 
Ellis et al. (2008) focus on differences in asset allocation between funds based on their 
trustee types, we explore that to what extent does asset allocation drive the cross-
sectional variation in individual fund returns. Accordingly, we not only rely on 
descriptive analysis of benchmark returns but also employ cross-sectional regression of 
individual fund returns against benchmark returns. Third, Ellis et al. (2008) mainly 
provides a comparative snapshot of expenses across different fund types and fee 
categories. In contrast, our research goes far beyond a descriptive analysis of fund 
expenses in the APRA dataset. We investigate the relationship between expenses and 
returns from active management to establish whether the latter activity adds any value to 
the members’ returns.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature on the relationship between asset allocation and returns and that between 
returns and expenses.  Section 3 describes the data used in this study. Section 4 reports 
the results of our analysis and section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Asset Allocation and Returns 
In their seminal 1986 study, Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (hereafter BHB) analyse the 
performance of 91 corporate pension plans in the United States between 1974 and 1983 
and report that the variability of a fund’s return over time could be mainly attributed to its 
investment policy or strategic asset allocation decision. They find that the asset allocation 
policy explains, on average, 93.6% of the variation in total returns of these plans over the 
                                                          
2 Survivorship bias is acknowledged as a serious issue in empirical finance that can potentially lead to 
spurious conclusions (see, Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross, 1992) 
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sample period. Later studies like Brinson, Singer and Beebower (1991) and Blake, 
Lehmann and Timmermann (1999) reach similar conclusions about the dominant role of 
asset allocation policy.3  
 One problem with the BHB study is that it does not examine that to what extent 
does asset allocation influence the return variation between pension funds. By its very 
design, their study is meant to explain the return variability of a fund over time rather 
than explaining the variation of returns in the cross-section of pension funds.4 Since our 
primary interest in this paper is to explain return differences between individual 
superannuation funds, it is pertinent to look at studies that review this aspect. Among 
them, Tokat, Wicas and Kinniry (2006) use a sample of US mutual fund returns from 
1966 to 2003 to conduct both time-series and cross-sectional regressions. Their results 
show that the asset allocation explains 82% of a fund’s return variation over time (which 
is consistent with the conclusion made by BHB on the high explanatory power of asset 
allocation) but only 19% of the cross-sectional variation in fund returns. Ibbotson and 
Kaplan (2000) conduct a similar analysis with US balanced funds’ data from 1988 to 
1998. They find that whilst asset allocation explains 93.6% of the variation of returns of a 
fund over time, it only explains 40% of the return variation between individual funds. 
Other studies like Vardharaj and Fabozzi (2007) and Xiong, Ibbotson, Idzorek and Chen 
(2010) find that asset allocation policy and active management are almost equally 
important in explaining return variation between funds.  
 In Australia, there has been little research done on the role of asset allocation in 
explaining return differences between superannuation funds. Sy (2010) attempts to assess 
                                                          
3 Despite the acknowledgement of the paramount importance of strategic asset allocation, there is 
disagreement about the true extent of its dominance in explaining variation of returns. For example, see 
Hensel, Ezra, and Ilkiw (1991) and Jahnke (1997). 
4 Jahnke regards this to be the crux of the debate. He suggests a cross-sectional regression of actual annual 
or cumulative returns against benchmark or policy returns, in which the comparative investment outcome is 
better represented. 
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the degree to which asset allocation explains the difference in investment returns between 
small APRA funds and other funds. The results indicate that out of an average return 
differential of 2.2% between the two groups, 0.9% can be attributed to asset allocation 
decision. Our study is the first to examine the extent to which asset allocation explains 
the variation in the cross-section of fund returns. 
2.2. Returns and Expenses 
Expenses refer to the fees and costs incurred by a fund for the general operation and 
management of assets. The relationship between expenses and performance is clearly of 
concern to investors. Ippolito and Turner (1987) examine the effect of fees and turnover 
on performance separately. They do not find any statistically significant relationship in 
either case suggesting that there is no adverse impact of turnover or fees on performance. 
Droms and Walker (1996) investigate the performance of mutual funds over a 20-year 
period and find a positive relationship between returns and expenses, which implies that 
the incurring higher expenses in anticipation of higher returns is justified. However, 
Carhart (1997) finds contradictory evidence to show that the returns of US mutual funds 
decrease by 154 basis points for every 100 basis point increase in their expense ratios.  
 In Australia, Drew (2003) investigates the issue of fees and performance. He finds 
the existence of a negative relationship between management fees and risk-adjusted 
returns with retail superannuation funds underperforming ASX 100 and ASX 200 
accumulation indices by 50 and 93 basis points respectively. Coleman, Esho and Wong 
(2006) analyse the relationship between returns, volatility and expenses. They find that 
higher fees charged by investment managers do not necessarily translate into higher 
returns. For example, retail funds are found to have the lowest returns but the highest 
expense ratio of 1.70%. They also find that industry funds have a higher expense ratio of 
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1.39% compared to the corporate and public sector funds with expense ratios of 0.87% 
and 0.82% respectively. 
 Whilst the above studies provide important insight into the relationship between 
returns and expenses of superannuation funds, none of them examines how expenses are 
related to returns from active management. This lack of scrutiny is surprising given the 
common perception of higher expenses resulting from greater active portfolio 
management. Therefore, in addition to updating the literature on relationship between 
total returns and expenses, we specifically examine the relationship between returns from 
active management and expenses. 
2.3. Economies of Scale 
In pension plans, economies of scale exist when the costs within a plan increase less than 
proportionally with increase in fund size, as fixed costs can be spread over a larger asset 
or member base. Mitchell and Andrews (1981) find significant evidence of scale 
economies in US pension plans with costs increasing by 0.5% and 0.3% for every 1% 
increase in participants and assets respectively. Supportive evidence is provided by 
Latzko (1999), who finds that mutual fund expenses increase by less than the 
proportional increase in fund assets. Furthermore, by computing an average cost curve, 
he shows that the scale economies begin to diminish when fund assets exceed $3.5 
billion.  
 In Australia, Malhotra, Marisetty and Ariff (2001) find no evidence of existence 
of scale economies in superannuation funds as a whole. However, they do report some 
evidence of scale economies among smaller funds in their sample. In contrast, Bateman 
and Mitchell (2004) find an increase of 0.4% (and 0.5%) in administrative expenses for 
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every 1% change in participants (and assets) implying existence of scale economies.5 
Their results also suggest that expenses in defined benefit (DB) plans are about one-third 
higher than that of defined contribution (DC) plans.6 This result is in contrast to that of 
an earlier US study by Klumpes and McCrae (1999) who find that expenses are greater 
for DC plans (0.82% of total assets) than that for DB plans (0.39% of total assets).7 
Coleman, Esho and Wong (2003) report economies of scale within Australian 
superannuation funds between 1995 and 2002. Among fund types, they observe greater 
cost reductions in corporate and public sector funds. However, the same authors find the 
evidence on economies of scale to be weaker in a later study when they exclude the 
smaller funds (with assets of less than $60 million) from their sample (Coleman, Esho 
and Wong 2006). Finally, Sy (2010) finds evidence of economies of scale among small 
APRA funds and suggests a cost efficiency threshold of $200,000. 
The findings on economies of scale among Australian superannuation funds so far 
has been inconclusive with some studies indicating it to be insignificant or weak, but 
others finding strong evidence of its existence. Moreover, with the exception of Sy 
(2010), all of the above studies examine data from the 1990s. Our study updates the 
research evidence by analysing recent data and therefore, is more relevant to the current 
debate on cost efficiencies of superannuation funds. 
3. Data 
The primary source of superannuation fund data is APRA. The data set used is sourced 
from the 2012 Superannuation Fund Level Profiles and Financial Performance 
publication, which has data for all APRA regulated superannuation funds with more than 
                                                          
5 The authors use a dataset where administrative expenses are reported under a heading ‘all expenses of an 
administrative and investment management nature’. They do not rule out the possibility of underestimation 
of investment expenses as a result of this categorisation. 
6 This is conjectured to be due to the higher costs associated with hiring actuaries and paying out retirement 
benefits in which the risk of the fund not meeting the required return is taken on by the sponsor. 
7 The authors attributed the lower cost of DB plans to greater cohesion of interest between employers and 
employees over that of financial intermediaries and members. 
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four members. The publication, however, excludes data from pooled superannuation 
trusts (PSTs) as their assets are captured in other superannuation funds, exempt public 
sector superannuation schemes (EPSSS), funds that wound up during a given reporting 
period and funds that did not submit an annual return.8  
 According to APRA, the rate of return (ROR) represents the combined earnings 
on all invested assets across all its investment options. The ROR would only be a 
reasonable representation of earnings from assets invested in the default option if the 
fund has just a few investment options and a large proportion of assets are invested in the 
default option. In other words, to analyse the performance of the default option, it would 
be inappropriate to consider funds whose assets are spread across a variety of investment 
options, as their reported returns to APRA reflect the combined performance of all the 
investment options and not just that of the default option.9 Therefore, we only include in 
our sample those funds that invest at least 95% of members’ assets in the fund’s default 
option. To reduce the potential effect of survivorship bias, all funds that meet the 
specified criteria are included in the sample regardless of whether they exist (or have data 
available) over the entire sample period.10 As a result, the number of funds in our sample 
varies from year to year.  
The number of funds comprising our sample and their total assets under 
management for each of the 9 years in our sample period is shown in Table 1. There is a 
decline in the absolute number of funds that qualify for our sample over time, which 
shows that there has been a shift of members’ assets from default options to other 
                                                          
8 A pooled superannuation trust is a unit trust which pools together assets of different superannuation funds 
and other approved deposit funds. 
9 For each fund, the APRA data provides the asset allocation profile of the default option only. 
10 Survivorship bias refers to funds that have existed over the entire sample period. This focus may lead to 
greater skewness or false conclusions, as funds that have discontinued their operations will be excluded 
from studies, and hence the sample will only represent funds that have been successful enough to survive 
the relevant period. 
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investment options in recent years. However, as a percentage of all funds reporting to 
APRA, the number of funds in our sample remains relatively steady over time.  
 Apart from ROR, the APRA publication also provides data on benefit structure, 
expenses, membership size, number of investment options, and the assets of the reporting 
superannuation funds. Table 2 displays summary statistics for these variables. Corporate 
funds are sponsored by the employer or pool of related employers. Investment within 
these funds is restricted to the employees of such organisations. Similarly, public sector 
funds are sponsored by the relevant government authority whose membership belongs to 
government employees. Both these types of funds operate on a ‘not for profit’ basis. 
Industry funds also operate on a ‘not for profit’ basis but they are sponsored by a group 
of companies or associations within a common industry, like hospitality or education. 
Whilst their membership is mainly comprised of those who are employed within the 
respective industry, many of these funds are now accessible to the general public. 
Coleman, Esho and Wong (2006) report that the ‘not for profit’ funds commonly charge 
lower fees and have a requirement of a 50% member representation on the board of 
trustees. The ‘for profit’ sector consists of retail funds, which are managed by 
commercial entities (mainly financial institutions) and open for membership to the 
general public. Since minimal amount of data is available for public sector funds within 
the APRA publication, we report these under corporate funds in this paper, wherever 
analysis is undertaken by fund types.11 As the numbers indicate, superannuation funds in 
Australia are predominantly of accumulation or DC type with very few funds offering 
DB plans to their members.12  
3.1 Returns and Expenses 
                                                          
11 This is consistent with Coleman, Esho and Wong (2006) who assert that corporate and public sectors 
funds operate in similar manners. 
12 The funds reported as belonging to the hybrid benefit structure in the APRA data are treated as DB plans 
within our sample. 
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We use gross returns of the funds instead of net returns as the former has a more direct 
relationship with the asset allocation policy decision of the sponsors. Asset allocation 
benchmark returns are reported gross of fees and expenses. Moreover, since part of the 
analysis investigates the relationship between expenses and returns, using gross returns 
allows for ease of interpretation. Active returns are calculated by taking the difference 
between gross ROR and asset allocation benchmark return. The expenses shown in the 
APRA publication represent all investment and operating expenses reported by 
superannuation funds. In this respect, we differ from Malhotra, Marisetty, and Ariff 
(2001) who use only operating expenses or Bateman and Mitchell (2004) who consider 
only administrative and investment expenses, where administrative expenses are a part of 
total operating expenses. 
3.2 Asset Allocation  
Asset allocation data is provided in terms of apportionment of funds between 7 distinct 
asset classes – Australian equities, international equities, Australian bonds, international 
bonds, listed property, unlisted property, and cash––as well as a separate category termed 
‘other assets’. While details of the ‘other assets’ category is not reported in the APRA 
publication, it is said to include assets in alternative investments such as hedge funds and 
those not included in the standard asset categories. Following Basu and Drew (2010) we 
apportion the ‘other assets’ allocation across all risky assets––shares, property and 
bonds.13 
3.3 Investment options 
The number of investment options refers to the number of predetermined asset allocation 
choices in which members have the option to invest. APRA advises that the ROR would 
                                                          
13 The BHB study as well as other papers like Arshanapalli, Coggin and Nelson (2001) allocate ‘other 
assets’ across all asset categories, including cash, on a pro-rata basis. Basu and Drew (2010) does not 
allocate to cash, as they consider the other category represents a risk-return profile that would normally not 
be associated with cash. 
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be a reasonable representation of fund earnings where a fund has only a few investment 
options and a large amount of assets are invested in the default option. To ensure that the 
ROR is a reasonable representation of the returns from the default option, we exclude 
funds with more than 50 investment options from the data set. On average, this filtering 
results in a sample where at least 95% of funds offer no more than 10 investment options.  
3.4 Index Returns 
To determine how much of the variation in fund returns is explained by asset allocation, a 
benchmark for the latter needs to be identified and its return calculated. We select an 
appropriate benchmark index for each asset class as outlined in Table 3. Asset allocation 
benchmark return is calculated as the sum of weights allocated to the different asset 
classes within a fund multiplied by the return on the corresponding asset market index.  
4. Results 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of fund returns and expenses. Both at aggregate 
level and by fund type, the average ROR is consistently less than the average benchmark 
return across the sample period. This result suggests that funds generally find it difficult 
to outperform the benchmark indices of the different asset markets they invest in. With 
respect to returns and expenses, no apparent relationship is observed at an aggregate or at 
the fund type level. Retail funds, on average, are found to have higher expense ratios and 
lower returns, while corporate (and public sector) and industry funds show relatively 
higher returns with lower expense ratios.  
 The higher average returns for the ‘not for profit’ funds is consistent with Ellis et 
al. (2008), although their study finds the expenses to be higher for industry funds than 
that for retail funds. In general, higher fees or expense ratios are attributed to greater fund 
manager expertise, more number of investment options, better customer service, 
marketing, and greater degree of investment management (Carhart 1997; Coleman et al. 
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2003). If higher expenses are incurred in employing greater expertise in fund 
management, it would be reasonable for members to expect superior performance. 
However, the descriptive statistics by different fund types illustrate that higher expenses 
do not necessarily correspond to higher returns.  
 The results should be interpreted with some caution, as they are dependent on the 
quality of the data reported to APRA. Ellis et al. (2008) point out that the reported returns 
are likely to have embedded expenses and taxes, especially for retail funds. Moreover, 
according to APRA, the expense data are generally understated by funds due to various 
reasons including some funds not being able to provide necessary information about 
entry and exit fees. 
4.1 Asset Allocation Policy and Fund Returns 
Table 5 reports the proportion of funds in our sample that have produced higher returns 
than that of their respective benchmarks in each year. Overall, individual superannuation 
funds appear to be struggling to match the asset allocation benchmark return. On average, 
only 35% of funds are able to produce returns that are greater than their respective asset 
allocation benchmark returns over the sample period. In 2008, only 17% of funds record 
outperformance. This period coincides with the serious downturn in the Australian and 
international equity markets due to the GFC. The following year, when the equity 
markets rebound, the proportion of outperformers increase to 51%.  
 Similar results are reported across different fund types. In terms of outperforming 
the benchmark portfolio, corporate funds appear to have a superior performance relative 
to both industry and retail funds with higher proportion of funds reporting returns greater 
than the asset allocation benchmark return in most years. The better showing may be 
partly due to the alignment of interests between the board and the funds members in 
corporate and public sector funds due to high member representation in boards. Many of 
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these funds have an employer contribution rate that is well in excess of the mandatory 
9% rate and hence there may be greater emphasis on performance. 
 Our results are consistent with Ippolito and Turner (1987) who find high levels of 
underperformance amongst US pension plans. In Australia, Drew (2003) provides 
evidence of retail funds underperforming the benchmark by a significant margin on a 
risk-adjusted basis. This finding is confirmed by Bateman and Thorp (2007) who show 
that funds generally do worse in comparison to a benchmark portfolio of asset class 
indices. Ellis et al. (2008) examines the impact of choice of ‘other assets’ benchmark on 
the performance results. While average gross returns of all fund types except retail 
outperform the asset allocation benchmark return when cash rate is used as the ‘other 
assets’ benchmark, using Australian share index to proxy ‘other assets’ results in 
underperformance by all fund types except public sector. Given our treatment of ‘other 
assets’ as explained in 3.2, the results appear to be consistent with their findings.14  
 Next, we analyse the important question of how much of the variation in returns 
between superannuation funds in our sample is explained by their respective asset 
allocation policies. Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) attempt to explain cross-sectional 
variation in fund returns among US pension funds by employing OLS regression. We 
similarly estimate the relationship between the ROR of individual funds and their asset 
allocation benchmark return (BR)  
    ROR  = α0 + β1BR + ε    (1)
 Table 6 outlines the r-square values for each regression from 2004 to 2012, 
representing the variation in returns that is explained by asset allocation policy. The 
regressions are performed both at the aggregate level and by fund types. The average r-
square at the aggregate level suggests that only 36% of the variation in returns among 
                                                          
14 The embedded expenses in the reported return data, as suggested in Ellis et al (2008), can explain part of 
the underperformance, especially for retail funds. 
Page | 15  
 
funds is explained by the difference in their strategic asset allocation. This result implies 
that funds engage in a considerable degree of active management, which could explain 
the remaining variation. This finding is consistent with the studies by Ibbotston and 
Kaplan (2000), Vardharaj and Fabozzi (2007) and Xiong, Ibbotson, Idzorek and Chen 
(2010), all of whom reported r-squares around 40%.  
 The above results demonstrate that the strategic asset allocation, whilst important, 
does not explain cross-sectional variation in returns among individual funds as well as it 
does for the temporal variation in returns. In the cross-section, the variation of returns 
between funds is significantly influenced by their active management of assets. To 
evaluate this relationship further, we perform separate regressions for corporate, industry, 
and retail funds. The average r-square estimates are 31%, 35% and 44% for these fund 
types respectively. The larger r-square value for retail funds seem to suggest that active 
management does not play as large a role in explaining actual returns of these funds in 
comparison to industry and corporate funds. It is a commonly held perception that that 
higher fees charged by some funds is a result of active portfolio management to deliver 
superior returns. Given the higher fees charged by retail funds, it comes as a surprise that 
a relatively smaller proportion of variation of returns in these funds could be explained 
by active management. 
4.2. Returns and Expenses 
The fees and expenses used to assess the relationship with returns aggregate all 
investment and operating expenses and expressed as a percentage of average assets. We 
initially examine the relationship between total returns and expenses. Next we turn to the 
relationship between active returns and expenses. Active returns are the returns made in 
excess of the asset allocation benchmark return and calculated by taking the difference 
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between ROR and BR. Estimating this relationship directly provides important insight 
into the true impact of active management on members’ account balance.  
 Both regressions are performed at the aggregate level and also by fund types. Our 
data spreads both in time series and cross-sectional dimensions. Pooling the data allows 
for dynamic comparison of the different funds over the entire sample period by 
simultaneously capturing the variation through time and cross-section. We regress gross 
returns as well as active returns against the expense ratio as follows. 
𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡(𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡     (2) 
 where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  and  𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡   are the active return and expense ratio of fund i in year t 
respectively. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) method to estimate the relationship in a 
pooled dataset could be essentially problematic due to possible serial correlation, 
contemporaneous correlation, and heteroskedasticity (Stimson 1985; Hicks 1994). We 
employ generalised least squares (GLS) regression to allow for possible unequal error 
variances and correlation between different errors. The results are reported in table 7. 
 At an aggregate level, fund returns have significantly negative relationship with 
expenses. Returns decrease by 0.1% for every 1% increase in expense ratio. For 
corporate funds, the relationship between the returns and expense ratio is not significant 
whilst industry funds show a weakly significant negative relationship. For the retail 
funds, there is a 0.74% decline in returns for every 1% increase in expense ratio. This 
difference between ‘not for profit’ and retail funds needs to be interpreted with caution. 
Ellis et al. (2008) points out that the apparent underperformance of retail funds is mainly 
a result of many of these funds reporting gross returns with embedded expenses and taxes 
rather than poor investment management skills.  
 Similar to our results for total returns, expenses seem to have a negative 
relationship with active returns. At an aggregate level, for every 1% increase in expense 
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ratio, active returns decrease by 0.28%. Similar to the previous investigation between 
total return and expense ratio, retail funds exhibit a negative relationship between active 
returns and expense ratio. Industry funds show a positive coefficient for expense ratio 
although it lacks statistical significance. The negative coefficient for retail funds (nearly 
70 basis points) has high significance. Active management is commonly stated as an 
important contributor of returns in retail funds. Our results suggest that, for these funds, 
the higher expenses associated with active portfolio management could not be justified 
by any claim of superior returns.  
 We also conduct regressions of returns against expense ratios for different fund 
types year by year over the sample period. Although the results are not presented here 
due to paucity of space, we find the expense ratio coefficients to be positive on a number 
of occasions. However, in 2008 and 2009, all fund types show negative coefficients. This 
seems to indicate that active management have hurt investors more during the volatile 
market conditions prevailing in those two years. Nevertheless, superannuation funds at an 
aggregate level do exhibit a statistically significant negative relationship between active 
returns and expenses, suggesting that the higher fees paid have actually resulted in a drag 
for active returns during the sample period. 
4.3 Economies of Scale 
To estimate scale economies, a translog cost function is commonly used (Latzko 1999). 
In this study, we manipulate this standard model following Bateman and Mitchell (2004), 
which allows economies of scale to vary with the level of assets, as identified by a multi-
product cost function in the following equation. 
ln(et) = α0 + β1ln(at) + β2 ln(pt) + β3ΣX + εt     (4) 
where et = total expenses (total investment and total operating expenses) 
at = total assets 
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pt = total number of members 
 X = sum of additional explanatory variables. 
 We test whether total assets and total number of members enrolled has any 
significant effect on the plan’s cost efficiency (or lack of it) by testing the hypothesis β1 
≠ 0 and β2 ≠ 0. If any of the individual hypotheses β1 = 0 and β2 = 0 are rejected, then we 
would expect the β1 and β2 coefficients exhibit values of less than 1 for scale economies 
to exist, suggesting that a 1% increase in assets (or members) will increase expenses at a 
rate of less than 1%.  
 We measure the additional impact of plan type, fund type and the number of 
investment options available, represented by the X variable. To illustrate the effect of 
plan type (DB or DC plans,) fund type (corporate/public, industry, or retail funds), and 
number of options available to investors, we conduct the following regression.15 
ln(et) = α0 + β1ln(at) + β2 ln(pt) + β3P + β4C+ β5I + β6O  + εt                       (5) 
where  P = dummy variable equal to 1 if DB plan type, 0 otherwise  
C = dummy variable equal to 1 if corporate funds, 0 otherwise 
I = dummy variable equal to 1 if industry fund, 0 otherwise 
  O = number of investment options. 
DC plans and retail funds are used as reference categories to interpret the coefficients of 
the relevant dummy variables.16 
 The results of the GLS regression are reported in Table 8. After controlling for 
the plan and fund types as well as the number of options, for every 1% increase in assets, 
there is 0.47% increase in expenses. Similarly, for every 1% increase in members, 
                                                          
15 We combine hybrid plans with DB plans as in Bateman and Mitchell (2004) 
16 One potential concern could be about not including the interaction effects of the plan and sponsor type 
variables among themselves and with other variables. Bateman and Mitchell (2004) include the interaction 
variables as an extension of the regression model similar to ours and find most of these to be statistically 
insignificant. 
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expenses rise by 0.35%. Both coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level and 
provide convincing evidence for existence of scale economies in superannuation funds. 
This result is consistent with previous Australian studies by Bateman and Mitchell (2004) 
and Coleman, Esho and Wong (2003) reporting scale economies. Bateman and Mitchell 
(2004) find that expenses increase 0.50% and 0.40% respectively for every 1% increase 
in assets and participants.17 These are slightly higher than our estimates. 
 As regards plan types, DB plans exhibit lower expenses than DC plans for every 
year of our sample period. Our results show that expenses for DB plans have been 45% 
lower than DC plans on average, after controlling for fund type, assets, and size of 
membership. This result is in contrast to Ippolito and Turner (1987) who suggest DB 
plans have higher costs due to their establishment and management expenses. As such, 
the higher costs in DC plans can partially be attributed to the maintenance of an extensive 
member base and a potential lack of cost efficiencies relative to those of DB plans. 
However, one has to be mindful that in our sample the vast majority of plans are DC 
plans, with DB plans not being more than 30% of the sample in any particular year. 
 The coefficients of the fund type variables differ between corporate and industry 
funds. While expenses for the corporate funds are not significantly different from that of 
the retail funds, the industry funds show significantly higher expenses.18 The results 
show that, ceteris parabus, industry funds have nearly 41% higher expenses compared to 
the retail funds. This result seems to indicate that, contrary to popular perception, all ‘not 
for profit’ funds may not necessarily have fewer expenses relative to the ‘for profit’ 
funds.  
                                                          
17 Malhotra, Marisetty and Ariff (2001), however, find no significant evidence of economies of scale on 
small funds. 
18 In our year-wise analysis, corporate funds had negative coefficients in 4 out of 6 years whereas industry 
funds exhibit positive coefficients in every year. 
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  It is expected that for every additional investment option, costs would increase to 
administer the increased selections available to members. Our results show that expenses 
do increase by 3% for every additional investment option over sample period. 
 Past research has shown varying cost efficiencies across different size categories. 
Coleman, Esho and Wong (2006) report average expense ratio increasing for the medium 
and large-sized funds relative to small-sized funds. On a different classification of scale, 
Malhotra, Marisetty and Ariff (2001) find evidence of economies of scale in funds with 
assets greater than $30 million. To further assess whether scale economies vary with fund 
size, we estimate cost functions across different asset size categories. Figure 1 shows the 
results. All asset size categories display economies of scale, with the exception of $50-
100 million category in which the asset coefficient is 1.07. The greatest scale benefit of 
asset size is observed among funds in the $100-500 million category closely followed by 
funds in the ‘less than $50 million’ category. Interestingly, the latter category of funds 
exhibits the greatest scale benefit in terms of number of members. On an average, scale 
benefit of asset size reduces significantly for funds with size of more than $500 million.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates returns and expenses of Australian superannuation funds between 
2004 and 2012. Our results suggest that almost two in three superannuation funds fail to 
match the asset allocation benchmark returns of their default options even before 
considering any expense. The return variation between the default options of 
superannuation funds is explained only partially by the strategic asset allocations chosen 
by the trustees that suggests that the funds engage in considerable active portfolio 
management. It appears that the result of such active management is detrimental to 
investors in more than one way. While fund returns fail to match passive market index 
returns at the gross level, higher expenses incurred on account of active management 
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certainly lower net returns. We find evidence of negative relationship between expenses 
and returns, and more importantly between expenses and active returns. For the latter, the 
negative relationship is more pronounced during the more volatile market periods.  
 Our result indicates scale economies do exist in the Australian superannuation 
fund industry. Unlike Coleman, Esho and Wong (2006) who find weak evidence of 
economies of scale, our results have strong statistical significance. In comparison to 
Bateman and Mitchell (2004), the scale benefits reported in our paper are slightly higher.  
Also, contrary to their study, we find strong evidence of DB plans having lower expense 
ratios relative to DC plans.  
 Our analysis by fund types reveals some interesting findings about retail funds. 
Surprisingly, we find that the variation of returns between these funds is better explained 
by their benchmark asset allocation than their industry and corporate counterparts. Also, 
unlike Bateman and Mitchell (2004) and several other studies, we find expense ratios of 
retail funds are not significantly different from employer sponsored funds and actually 
lower than industry funds after controlling for assets, members, and plan type (DB or 
DC), and number of investment options. However, since we exclusively analyse funds 
with very high proportion of assets invested in the default option, one needs to exercise 
caution when comparing with results reported by other researchers. 
 The evidence presented in this paper leads to two clear policy implications. First, 
it lends support to the ‘low cost default’ argument for majority of members who 
demonstrate little engagement with their superannuation investments. It appears that the 
default funds would do well to deliver benchmark index returns for their members rather 
than pursuing active returns. Second, our results suggest that economies of scale is 
visible in superannuation funds industry and some funds may be bearing too high 
expenses with fewer members and assets to spread their costs to achieve such cost 
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efficiencies. A rationalisation in the number of default options may be necessary to 
optimise members’ retirement benefits. 
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Table 1: Fund Sample 
This table presents the number of funds analysed in the sample period 2004-2012 and their combined assets under 
management.  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of Funds 
in the Sample 
124 130 91 77 70 49 41 40 48 
       
  Total Assets 
(million $) 
47,727 66,399 41,448 45,020 42,518 19,385 35,567 26,387 46,414 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
This table presents superannuation fund descriptive statistics across the sample period 2004-2012, where DC are defined contribution plans, DB are 
defined benefit plans (combined with hybrid plans) and mean number of options are the number of investment options available. 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Mean Cost ($'000) 3,015 3,536 4,748 5,523 6,292 3,851 4,526 6,611 6,799 
Mean Assets ($'000) 346,729 469,371 416,574 530,122 616,566 417,671 1,202,568 626,857 954,037 
Minimum Assets ($’000) 315 51 712 1376 1339 1328 641 538 1635 
Maximum Assets ($’000) 6,021,587 6,893,335 7,996,051 10,563,053 12,368,332 3,740,752 13,211,506 15,823,486 18,067,467 
Mean Members ('000) 47,083 52,851 64,631 73,427 88,510 73,182 99,179 113,620 124,839 
DC (total) 117 126 88 76 67 47 29 30 37 
DB (total) 7 4 3 1 3 2 12 10 11 
Corporate & Public (total) 86 74 46 35 31 18 18 18 16 
Industry (total) 18 22 16 14 13 8 7 5 5 
Retail (total) 20 34 29 28 26 23 16 17 27 
Mean Number of Options 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Total Number of Funds 124 130 91 77 70 49 41 40 48 
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Table 3: Benchmark Indices 
This table presents the indices utilized in the calculation of the asset allocation benchmark 
return, reported in Australian dollars. 
Asset Class Index 
Australian Equities S&P/ASX 300 Index 
International Equities MSCI World ex AU Index  
Property AMP Capital Core Property Fund 
Australian Fixed Interest UBS Australian Government Index (7-10yr) 
International Fixed Interest Barclays Capital Global Treasury  
Cash UBS Bank Bill Index 0+yr 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Returns and Expenses 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of fund return and expense ratio across the sample period, at an aggregate and fund-type level, where the fund types are corporate (combined 
with public), industry and retail. The expense ratio is the sum of investment and operating expenses, divided by average assets. The number of funds represents the number of 
observations within each individual sample period year. 
ALL FUNDS 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
 
Mean Rate of Return (%) 13.56 12.45 13.72 14.94 -6.3 -8.03 4.83 4.02 0.34 5.50 
 
Mean Asset Allocation Benchmark Return (%) 13.79 14.47 13.02 17.00 -2.63 -7.14 6.75 6.49 0.76 6.95 
 
Mean Expense Ratio (%) 1.14 1.54 3.78 1.50 1.99 1.61 3.85 3.79 1.6 2.31 
 
Number of funds 124 130 91 77 70 49 40 41 48 74 
FUND TYPES  
           Corporate 
            & Public Mean Rate of Return (%) 14.19 13.07 15.13 16.20 -7.44 -8.92 6.16 5.42 0.83 6.07 
 
Mean Asset Allocation Return (%) 14.43 14.83 13.83 18.27 -3.63 -7.15 6.43 6.32 0.4 7.08 
 
Mean Expense Ratio  (%) 1.16 1.38 1.79 1.56 2.03 1.14 4.21 3.49 1.21 2.00 
 
Number of funds 86 74 45 35 31 18 18 18 16 38 
            Industry Mean Rate of Return (%) 13.87 14.30 16.04 17.16 -6.77 -12.26 9.82 4.61 0.52 6.37 
 
Mean Asset Allocation Return (%) 13.83 16.1 15.13 19.57 -2.46 -10.48 7.13 6.34 -0.15 7.22 
 
Mean Expense Ratio (%) 1.53 1.09 1.17 1.09 1.26 1.09 2.5 1.77 1.43 1.44 
 
Number of funds 18 22 16 14 13 8 7 5 5 12 
            Retail Mean Rate of Return (%) 10.6 9.9 11.84 12.27 -4.72 -5.86 6.01 5.92 0.01 5.11 
 
Mean Asset Allocation Return (%) 11 12.62 10.56 14.12 -1.52 -5.96 6.94 6.73 1.14 6.18 
 
Mean Expense Ratio (%) 1.86 1.95 2.03 1.8 1.99 2.06 4.05 4.7 1.86 2.48 
 
Number of funds 20 34 29 28 26 23 16 17 27 24 
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Table 5: Benchmark Outperformance 
This table reports the number of funds outperforming or producing higher returns than the asset allocation benchmark return across the sample period 2004-2012 at an industry and 
sector level, where the fund types are corporate (combined with public), industry and retail. The number of funds represents the number of observations within each individual 
sample period year. 
    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
ALL FUNDS 
          
 
Outperformers 51 19 61 16 12 25 20 11 23 26 
 
Number of Funds 124 130 91 77 70 49 40 41 48 74 
 
Proportion 41% 15% 67% 21% 17% 51% 50% 27% 48% 36% 
 
      
   
 
FUND TYPES  
   Corporate & Public Outperformers 34 12 35 7 5 8 7 5 9 14 
 
Number of Funds 86 74 46 35 31 18 18 18 16 38 
 
Proportion 40% 16% 76% 20% 16% 44% 39% 28% 56% 36% 
            Industry Outperformers 8 3 10 2 2 2 6 1 3 4 
 
Number of Funds 18 22 16 14 13 8 7 5 5 12 
 
Proportion 44% 14% 63% 14% 15% 25% 86% 20% 60% 34% 
            Retail Outperformers 9 4 16 7 5 6 8 5 11 8 
 
Number of Funds 20 34 29 28 26 23 18 17 27 25 
  Proportion 45% 12% 55% 25% 19% 26% 44% 29% 41% 32% 
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Table 6: Cross-Sectional Variation in Fund Returns 
 
This table reports the estimates for the coefficient of determination (r-square) representing to what extent the variation in returns between superannuation funds is explained 
by the differences in their asset allocation policy. Total returns of individual funds are regressed against their asset allocation benchmark returns. The regression is estimated 
across the sample period 2004-2012 at aggregate and fund type level, where the fund types are ‘Corporate’, ‘Industry’ and ‘Retail’. The number of funds appears in 
parenthesis 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
           All Funds 0.4752 0.2325 0.2008 0.6338 0.403 0.2304 0.3823 0.2826 0.3947 0.359 
           
By Fund types 
         Corporate 0.2553 0.4039 0.216 0.2507 0.2921 0.086 0.4486 0.1974 0.6167 0.307 
Industry 0.4755 0.2943 0.1479 0.3708 0.2167 0 0.6014 0.862 0.186 0.351 
Retail 0.6594 0.4054 0.1376 0.8173 0.5028 0.31 0.2914 0.3332 0.5091 0.441 
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Table 7: Relationship of Expense Ratio with Returns 
This table reports the GLS regression results of superannuation funds’ total returns and active returns 
against expense ratios. Active return is the difference between rate of return and asset allocation 
benchmark return and expense ratio is the sum of investment and operating expenses, divided by average 
assets. The relationships are estimated across the sample period 2004-2009 at aggregate and fund type 
level, where the fund types are ‘Corporate’, ‘Industry’ and ‘Retail’. Values in the parentheses represent 
standard errors. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Rate of Returns Active Returns 
  
 
Expense Ratio Coefficient 
  
     All funds -0.102*** -0.282*** 
 
 
(0.019) (0.012) 
 
     Corporate -0.049 0.086 
 
 
(0.096) (0.018) 
 
     Industry 0.552** 0.630*** 
 
 
(0.232) (0.023) 
 
     Retail -0.745*** -0.697*** 
 
 
(0.093) (0.019) 
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Table 8: Economies of Scale 
This table reports estimates of a multi-product cost function over the entire sample 
period of 2004-2009, where the dependent variable is logarithm of expenses, and the 
independent variables are logarithm of assets, logarithm of members, plan type as 
represented by a dummy variable (with ‘DC plans’ as the reference category), fund 
type as represented by dummy variables for each respective fund type (with ‘Retail’ 
as the reference category) and the number of investment options available. Values in 
the parentheses represent standard errors. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Explanatory 
variable 
 Dependent Variable  
ln(expenses) 
 Alpha -1.359*** 
 
  (0.285) 
Plan Scale Assets (ln) 0.467*** 
  (0.030) 
 Members (ln) 0.345*** 
 
 (0.025) 
Plan Type DB (vs DC) -0.454*** 
 
 (0.103) 
Fund Type Corporate 0.070 
 
 (0.114) 
 Industry 0.414*** 
 
 (0.117) 
 Options 0.032*** 
 
 (0.009) 
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                      Figure 1: Scale Economies across Asset Size 
 
Figure 1 depicts the estimates of economies of scale across asset sizes, where the log of 
expenses is regressed against the log of assets and log of members. The x-axis represents 
the coefficients of the variables and the y-axis represents asset size.  
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